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Turkish identity on the road to the EU: basic elements of French and German oppositional discourses

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Identifying a collectivity consists of producing a series of rational arguments, emotional judgments and aesthetic choices with the purpose of distinguishing that particular collectivity from the others. Each collective identification is, therefore, an exercise in boundary drawing, separating the insiders from the outsiders, ‘us’ from ‘them’ and ‘we’ from ‘the others’. Some recent studies on European identity have shown that Turkey is treated as an ‘other’ in the mental maps of many Europeans. Hence, according to an important cross-country qualitative study on European identity, carried out on behalf of the European Commission, the respondents have drawn a clear line between those countries that they believe form an ‘integral part’ of Europe and those that do not:

The attitudes observed in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and Austria present relatively similar traits. As in the countries of the South of Europe, the idea comes across that there is a sort of moral duty to admit countries which historically and culturally form an integral part of Greater Europe and with which one’s country has in the past sometimes had just as strong ties as with certain existing Member States. . . However, the candidacy of Turkey is much more problematic in this regard and even raises absolute opposition.¹

In recent years, identity-based arguments opposing Turkey’s accession to the EU have been loudest and strongest in France and Germany, compared to the other major EU member countries. As we shall see below in the Eurobarometer surveys, in both countries public opposition to Turkey’s EU membership has been much higher than the EU25 average. In both France and Germany, leading centre-right parties—the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) in France and the Christian Democratic parties (CDU/CSU) in Germany—have officially positioned themselves against Turkish EU membership, on the grounds that Turkey is not a European country. Instead, they have proposed what they called a ‘privileged partnership’. The UMP-dominated French parliament went so far as to pass a constitutional amendment, subjecting Turkey’s EU membership to a public referendum. Turkey became one of the hottest issues during the French debates around the European Constitutional Treaty in late 2004 and early 2005, so much so that in the rhetoric of many French politicians saying no to Turkey and saying

no to the EU Constitution became intractably linked. Some right-wing groups based in France, calling themselves ‘European Citizens’ Resistance Campaign’, even started a campaign to ‘Cross Turkey off the Euro Map’. ‘Turkey is not part of the European bloc by any stretch of imagination, be it on sociological, historical, geographical, cultural, political, or religious grounds’, argued the campaign leaders. They called upon the European citizens to show their opposition to Turkey ‘by marking Turkey with a red cross on all your banknotes, in the bottom right-hand corner of the map of Europe at the verso of every Euro’. They did not forget to add that ‘your banknotes remain legal tender which cannot be refused!’

The main line dividing the pro-Turkish and anti-Turkish positions among the political elites in both France and Germany appears to be the left–right axis. Those who have actively supported, or have at least in principle agreed to, Turkey’s EU accession have generally come from the left of the political spectrum. Those who have adopted a negative or an altogether exclusionist position have usually been found among the ranks of the right-wing parties, particularly of radical and extremist varieties. There are some exceptions to this rule, though, the most notable being the generally pro-Turkish stance of the former right-wing French president, Jacques Chirac. Right-wing conceptions of European identity by French and German elites today, and Turkey’s place in those identity constructions, will be the focus of this paper. I will begin by evaluating the basic results of some pan-European opinion polls, showing how they reflect current French and German public attitudes towards Turkey.

I will then move on by exploring the constituent elements of the anti-Turkey discourses of the right-wing political and intellectual elites in France and Germany. Finally, I will examine the issue of Islam in general and the question of the headscarf in particular, showing how they shape the negative public image of Turkey in France and Germany.

This paper is the first product of a long-term research project on the identity dimensions of French and German attitudes towards EU–Turkey relations. The project reviewed recently published popular and scholarly books, journal articles, newspaper commentaries and other printed material on Turkey, including the transcripts of the parliamentary debates devoted to the issue of EU–Turkey relations. In addition to the printed material, some 11 websites and Internet discussion groups, partly or wholly devoted to the issue of Turkey, were examined. Finally, in autumn and winter 2005, 25 interviews were conducted with political and intellectual elites in France and Germany, who were asked to give both their own opinions and their evaluations of the intellectual milieu in their countries regarding the cultural dimensions of Turkey’s integration with the EU.

‘Turkey, the disliked country’: evidence from the polls

Hrant Dink, the Armenian-Turkish journalist who recently lost his life in a terrorist attack in Istanbul, said at a conference on EU–Turkish relations that, at the emotional level, what was binding the European Union and Turkey together was not love but fear. What he meant by this was that the two sides did not have any particular willingness to live together, but could not separate their ways

2See <http://uk.rayezlaturquie.com/>. 
either, out of the fear that the costs of divorce would be greater than the costs of marriage. A similar opinion was voiced by Marc Galle, a former member of the European Parliament and co-chair of the EU–Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee in the early 1990s, who wrote a book entitled *Turkey, the Disliked Country*.

A number of opinion polls conducted in Turkey and Europe have yielded data that lend support to the views of Dink and Galle. Hence, in a survey conducted in mid-2006 by the US-based Transatlantic Trends, people in nine selected EU member states (UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain) were asked to rank certain countries on the basis of how much ‘affection’ they feel for them, with ‘0’ signifying no affection and ‘100’ full affection. Among the nine EU member states included in the survey, Turkey happened to be one of the least liked countries with an average ‘affection grade’ of 42, above only Palestine (38) and Iran (28). For example, Germany’s affection rate for Turkey was 43 (at about the European average) and France’s was 38 (well below the European average). European affections towards Israel (43), China (46) and Russia (47) remained low but still above that for Turkey.

One concrete result of the apparent lack of affection for Turkey on the part of the European publics is that Turkey is the least wanted country when it comes to EU Enlargement, even ranking below some Balkan countries, such as Serbia, which have only been given ‘potential candidate’ status. According to a Eurobarometer poll taken in the spring of 2006, when asked if they would oppose or support Turkey’s membership in the EU once Turkey complies with all the conditions set by the European Union, close to 50 per cent of the respondents in EU25 said they would be on the opposing side, while the supporters remained at about 40 per cent. German opponents to Turkey’s EU entry reached a record level of about 70 per cent while French opposition to Turkey remained at the high figure of nearly 55 per cent. Only 27 per cent of the German and approximately 40 per cent of the French respondents said they would be in favour of extending EU membership to Turkey.

Basic elements of right-wing oppositional discourse on Turkey

Right-wing political elites usually draw upon pre-modern notions to define European identity today. From their perspective, three major constituents of European identity appear to be geography, history and religion. Geography is epitomized in the well-known attempts to draw the definitive territorial boundaries, borders or frontiers of Europe. It is worth noting here that, in the

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3 H. Dink, ‘Minority rights in Turkey on the road to the EU’, speech delivered at the conference Fourth Bogazici Student Meeting on the Process of Accession Negotiations between the EU and Turkey, organized by the Student Forum of Bogazici University’s Centre for European Studies, Bogazici University, Istanbul, 22 December 2006.


cross-country study on European identity mentioned above, whenever the respondents used the term ‘geography’, they meant to exclude certain peoples and countries from Europe: ‘When geography is mentioned ... it is to exclude countries or areas ... i.e. Russia ... and, by extension, Ukraine and Belarus. Turkey is also often spontaneously considered to be non-European.’ Geography, as it appears from the OPTEM study, has become an essentially exclusionary device in the popular political culture of today’s Europe. Boundaries, in other words, are drawn with the purpose of excluding certain peoples, marked as outsiders and others, rather than including them. History is sometimes understood as encompassing the classical or pre-medieval ‘dawn’ of modern European civilization that can be traced back to ancient Greece and Rome; sometimes it is construed as referring to Europe’s post-Roman past rooted in medieval feudalism. Finally, religion is often thought of as consisting solely of Christianity, which time and again is taken to be a uniform whole without regard to its many internal divisions. A second, and post-Second World War, connotation of Europe’s religious tradition is conceptualized as the ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition, adding the Jewish tradition to the Christian one and positioning both against Islam.

Geographical, historical and religious arguments with the purpose of proving that Turkey does not belong to Europe and therefore has no place in the EU, can be found in abundance in the statements of right-wing French and German politicians in recent years. This type of categorical exclusionism of Turkey, on the basis of its ‘cultural incompatibility’ with Europe, can be found in the words of two well-known extreme right-wing politicians: Philippe De Villiers, currently head of the MPF (Movement for France) party, and Michael Glos, who was Chairman of the Christian Social Union Caucus in the German Bundestag in 2001. ‘Turkey is not European’, De Villiers said on the MPF website, ‘neither by its history, nor by its geography, nor by its culture.’ Europe, according to De Villiers, must once and for all determine its borders. This determination must not be arbitrary but be based on the recognition of its roots, of the great civilising experiments which constituted it.

And, there is nothing to be ashamed of our roots and no need to open up the ‘Christian Club’ to the outsiders, as if multiculturalism were our only future.’

Similarly, Michael Glos, in a 2001 article entitled ‘Is Turkey Ready for Europe?’, claimed that fulfilling the political and economic Copenhagen criteria were not enough to judge a country’s European credentials. In his view, a country must also comply with the ‘cultural criteria’ of EU membership:

In accepting new candidates we must expect them not only to meet the criteria laid down in Copenhagen, but also to integrate easily into the European cultural context. ... precisely this capability is in doubt in the case of Turkey, a country which belongs to a different political and cultural sphere.”

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9De Villiers, 2006, op. cit.
Perhaps the most well-known cultural exclusionism vis-à-vis Turkey was that of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the former French President and Chair of the Convention on the Future of Europe. In an interview with the French newspaper *Le Monde* in November 2002, a month before the Copenhagen summit of the European Council, that was expected to take a decision regarding the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, d’Estaing said that admitting Turkey ‘would be the end of the European Union’, because Turkey ‘has a different culture, a different approach, a different way of life … Its capital is not in Europe, 95 percent of its population live outside Europe, it is not a European country.’

This line of argumentation can be found, more recently, in statements made by the new French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, during the 2007 election campaign:

Turkey is not a European country, and as such she does not have a place inside the European Union. A Europe without borders would be the death of the great idea of political Europe. A Europe without borders is to condemn her to become a sub-region of the United Nations. I simply do not accept it.

In similar vein, several years earlier, Edmund Stoiber, minister-president of the German state of Bavaria and chairman of the Christian Social Union (CSU), said it must be recognized that Europe as an entity has geographic limits which do not extend to the Turkey–Iraq border. Turkish political and intellectual elites usually take pride in the notion that Turkey is a bridge between the East and the West, connecting Asia to Europe. In the eyes of Turkish leaders, this is a reason for the EU to include Turkey. According to the then CDU leader and now German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, on the other hand, this is a good reason for not making Turkey a full member of the EU: ‘… a bridge … should never belong totally to one side. Turkey can fulfil its function of a bridge between Asia and Europe much better if it does not become a full member of the EU.’

A political union needs something like a we-feeling. This we-feeling is something more than a commitment to democracy and human rights. It has to do with a centuries-old shared history: Greek antiquity, Roman law, the conflict between the Pope and the German Kaiser in the Middle Ages, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, all these that give Europe its specific character.

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14Speech by A. Merkel, German Parliament, plenary debate on Turkey–EU relations, 16 December 2004. Available online at <www.bundestag.de>.  
15Deutscher Bundestag, 16 December 2004, ibid.
‘Extinguished volcano’ is perhaps a good metaphor to understand the importance of Christianity in the discourses of the right-wing political elites of both France and Germany regarding European identity. The volcano has long stopped its activity but it is still there, it serves as a place marker, and perhaps one day it will start to erupt again. No mainstream right-wing politician today claims that a good European must also be a good, active, practising Christian. However, although no longer actively practised by the large majority of the European population, Christianity or rather sharing a common Christian heritage still serves for many right-wing political leaders as an identity marker. This sets Europeans (or ‘true Europeans’) apart from non-Europeans (or ‘false Europeans’ and ‘new-born Europeans’). Christianity is understood not so much as a belief system or a theology but as a civilizational idea, political culture and lifestyle. As such, for example, it is believed that the cultural roots of some fundamental secular European values, such as the separation of spiritual and worldly affairs, the separation between the public and the private spheres, the idea of natural rights protecting the individual against the state, and, following Max Weber, the culture of capitalism, all have their roots in Europe’s Christian heritage.

Hence, at a March 2007 press conference to mark the signature of the Declaration of Berlin, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the European Economic Community, German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, representing the presidency of the EU, said that ‘the Judeo-Christian values … sustain the EU’ and that ‘we are marked by this Judeo-Christian past’.16 In a February 2007 interview with the German news weekly Focus, Merkel stressed the importance she attached to Europe’s common Christian values: ‘No one doubts that they significantly shape our life, our society. I wonder, can we maintain the formative aspects of Christianity for day-to-day politics if the political sphere does not stand by them?’17 Agustín José Menéndez, in an article entitled ‘Christian Values and European Identity’, argues critically that for a number of well-known European constitutional lawyers of pro-Christian orientations, Christianity, or rather Catholicism, lies at the basis of ‘the most fundamental ethical values’ and the ‘common constitutional traditions’ of European nations.18 As such, according to these legal scholars, Christianity forms the ‘deep constitution’ of the Union.19 What makes a person ‘Christian’, in this new paradigm, is not so much spirituality, belief and prayer, but the deep-seated and generationally transmitted civilization, way of life and values. This point is best expressed in the words of one of my interviewees, Heinrich August Winkler, professor of European history at Humboldt University, Berlin:

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19Menéndez, 2005, op. cit., p. 188.
What are the Western values? The most important is separation of powers, which started to occur in the 18th century. The historical roots of the modern separation of powers goes back to the separation of powers between the church and the state in European Christendom. Western values are linked to Christianity, but not absolutely. . . In principle, a non-Western and non-Christian country like Turkey can adopt Western values, without sharing Christianity and Western history. However, this westernisation will take a very long time and it will not be completed in ten to fifteen years. A long time is necessary.²⁰

This new discourse applies a series of critical transformations to the meaning and function of Christianity. In the first place, it re-articulates Christianity as a set of completely secular values and attitudes. Secondly, it affirms those values as being the constituent elements of European identity. Thirdly, by assuming that those values can be acquired by a community only in the long durée of history and by way of generational transmission, it ascribes a ‘genetic’ characteristic to European identity, thereby making Europeanness an identity that one cannot acquire but has to be born into. Fourthly, it assumes that Muslims and other people who do not come from a Christian tradition, and who do not share the ‘genetic pool’ of Europeanness, would therefore have a hard time in acquiring European values and getting ‘integrated’ into European societies. Fifthly, by so doing, the right-wing political discourse transforms the metaphysical problem of religion into a this-worldly problem, by articulating it in the well-known language of ‘integration’. This new paradigm makes conversion a virtual impossibility. Conversion to Christianity as religion in no way guarantees conversion to Christianity as civilization, to be understood here as a set of historically transmitted secular values and identity markers. Hence, even if a non-Western person, such as a Turk in Germany or an Algerian in France, chooses to convert to Christianity, he or she cannot become a ‘civilizational Christian’ and thus a ‘true European’, because he or she does not carry the Christian ‘heritage’ in his or her ‘cultural genes’.

How does Turkey fit into this European right-wing discourse on religion? The argument can be put in a nutshell as follows: We cannot integrate Muslim Turkey into the (‘civilizationally Christian’) EU, because we could not integrate Muslim immigrants into the (‘civilizationally Christian’) French, German and other European societies. Sylvie Goulard, a French intellectual and an ardent opponent of Turkish accession to the EU, has expressed this position very clearly:

By underestimating the concrete difficulties our societies have to properly integrate Muslims already living in our communities, [if we admit Turkey into the EU] we could in the end be increasing the risk of a ‘clash of civilisations’ within Europe, instead of avoiding it.²¹

²⁰Interview with Professor H. A. Winkler, Berlin, Germany, 18 October 2005.
Nicolas Sarkozy, leader of the largest right-wing party in France, shared Goulard’s view:

We have a problem of integration of Muslims that raises the issue of Islam in Europe. To say it is not a problem is to hide from reality. If you let one hundred million Turkish Muslims come in, what will come of it?22

Even the long-standing secular tradition of Muslim Turkey does not make it any more ‘integrateable’ to Europe, because it is generally believed that Turkish secularism is fake, it is artificial, it has been assimilated by a small Westernized elite, it has not submerged into the ‘cultural genes’ of the larger Turkish society, and it has been protected only by the force of arms. ‘The army is the only force that might stop Islamism in Turkey’, say the authors of a French anti-Turkey website. ‘Turkey’s accession to the EU would mean that the army would have been withdrawn from the political and economic life. Hence, the accession of Turkey to the EU is likely to cause the total swing of Turkey to Islamism.’23

Feudal Islam, submissive women, savage men

Historically, the image of Islam and Muslims in Europe has not been particularly bright. As observed by many scholars of European identity, Islam for centuries represented the ‘other’ in European identity constructions. This supposed ‘otherness’ of Islam, in contrast to the Judeo-Christian tradition, is perhaps best captured in the following words of Max Weber:

Islam displays other characteristics of a distinctively feudal spirit: the obviously unquestioned acceptance of slavery, serfdom, and polygamy; the disesteem for and subjection of women; the essentially ritualistic character of religious obligations; and finally, the great simplicity of religious requirements and the even greater simplicity of the modest ethical requirements. … Judaism and Christianity were specifically bourgeois-urban religions, whereas for Islam the city had only political importance. … Islam, in contrast to Judaism, lacked the requirement of a comprehensive knowledge of the law and lacked the intellectual training in casuistry which nurtured the rationalism of Judaism. The ideal personality type in the religion of Islam was not the scholarly scribe (Literat), but the warrior. … Islam was diverted completely from any really methodical control of life by the advent of the cults of saints, and finally by magic.24

What do European publics mean exactly when they talk about ‘Islam’ in particular or ‘religion’ in general? In a previous qualitative research that I conducted among citizens from five major EU countries (Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Spain) who stayed in Istanbul for three months or longer, I observed that the European respondents interpreted religion not so much as a theological

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system, but as a way of life. Seventeen ordinary persons were interviewed for this research in autumn 2002. Nine were men and eight women, with an average age of 37. The main reason for most of them to come and live in Istanbul was business, followed by marriage and educational exchange. What the respondents were opposed to in Islam was not its theological system but the way of life they believed it breeds. As far as religion was concerned, for the modern Europeans, in contrast to their medieval counterparts, what really mattered was not so much differences in the ways people understood and prayed for God. They were not opposed to Islam as a belief system and did not necessarily consider Muslims as infidels and unbelievers. Actually, they did not appear to know or care much about the theological aspects of religion, whether Christianity or Islam. What they were most sensitive about were the ways in which religion shaped and influenced people’s social and political lives. In that sense, almost all European respondents said that religion was important but that it must stay in its proper place, which is the personal sphere, and must not be allowed to play a role in politics, law and society. They said they were opposed to Islam so long as it is mobilized as a social, political and cultural force to deny the rights of women and to drive people away from a modern life.  

These observations are supported by the findings of two recent Europe-wide opinion polls. In a survey conducted in the spring of 2006 in nine EU member countries (UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain), Turkey and the USA, it was found that 91 per cent of the respondents in the EU countries surveyed believe that radical Islam poses an important threat to Europe. The figure is 91 per cent in France and 95 per cent in Germany. In a similar vein, according to the findings of the Transatlantic Trends’ 2006 survey mentioned above, 88 per cent of the sample in the nine EU member countries surveyed believe that the values of Islam are not compatible with the values of democracy. The figure is 95 per cent in France and 98 per cent in Germany.  

Another survey, conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2006, found that the overwhelming majority of the publics in the largest EU member countries expressed the opinion that Muslims are not respectful of women. The figure was 80 per cent for Germany and 77 per cent for France. 

This brings us to the issue of gender inequality in Islam. Islamic gender relations, for almost all European respondents, are centred upon the subordination of women to men, and the headscarf is the very symbol of that subordination, which is often referred to as ‘gender apartheid’ by Western writers. In other words, the headscarf and what it is believed to epitomize—women’s enslavement—is taken to be the very antithesis, the reversal, of European modernity. The latter has evolved, as the narrative of modernization has it, along with the liberation of women and the equalization of gender
relations. The idea that a woman could be both Muslim and modern, wear a headscarf and at the same time become free of male domination, seems not to have gained much currency beyond academic circles. Hence, many educated women vehemently oppose the headscarf out of the conviction that any tolerance for it today would strengthen the hands of not only Muslim but also Christian and other conservatives, leading sooner or later to a deterioration of women’s hard-won rights on the European plane.29

A closer reading of the texts on this issue reveals that the headscarf, and what it is believed to stand for, namely, women’s submission to men, has a deeper meaning, corresponding to the European understanding of the difference between civilization and barbarism. To put it in a nutshell, civilization connotes a process of the socialization of male biological instincts and their re-direction from destructive to constructive ends. Barbarism represents a culture dominated by an uncontrolled, un-socialized and ultimately destructive male psyche. The liberation of women and the equalization of the male and female genders in both the public and private spheres constitutes the very essence of modern European civilization, by creating a series of institutional and normative constraints on male energy and thereby re-channelling it to peaceful, creative and productive goals. Reviewing a number of best-selling popular texts on Islam recently published in Western Europe and North America, Sherene Razack notes that:

the violence Muslim women endure at the hands of Muslim men becomes a marker of Muslim men’s barbarism … As fatally pre-modern, tribal, non-democratic and religious, the barbarism of Islam is principally evident in the treatment of women in Muslim communities. … saving Muslim women from the excesses of their society marks both Western men and Western women as more civilised.30

If forced marriage, forced pregnancy, beating and honour crimes constitute the basic forms of violence that Muslim men direct against Muslim women, rape is said to be the most common form of violence of Muslim men against Western women. Jamie Glazov, the Russian-born Canadian historian and managing editor of the right-wing online Frontpage Magazine, in an article called ‘Muslim Rape, Feminist Silence’, quotes two Muslim clergymen, one in Australia and the other one in Denmark, who normalized the rape of Australian and Danish women by Muslim immigrants by saying that ‘unveiled women who get raped deserve it’ and that ‘women who do not veil themselves, and allow themselves to be “uncovered meat”, are at fault if they are raped’. The clergymen’s judgments, according to Glazov, are ‘legitimised by various Islamic texts and numerous social and legal Islamic structures’.31

While rape represents the basic form of sexual violence, terror is certainly the most important type of political violence associated with Muslim men. Hence,

according to the so-called ‘terrorist profiling’ policies, which gained wide currency in North America and Western Europe following the events of 9/11, the mere fact of being an Arab- or Muslim-looking young male was taken to be a sufficient reason to suspect a person as a potential terrorist. Friso Roscam Abbing, spokesman of EU Home Affairs and Justice Commissioner Franco Frattini, claimed that ‘positive profiling’ of potential terrorists ‘would ensure that “trusted travellers” … could benefit from smooth airport security checks’. Those who are most likely to breach the trusted travellers’ contract are, as expected, Muslim travellers, foreign or immigrant. Hence, he explained, the EU foreign ministers had agreed to examine ‘whether it is possible and politically desirable … to institute a Europe-wide training program for imams to make sure their preaching is in line with EU and member-state laws’.32 Table 1 summarizes the major types and targets of the destructive male energy of Muslim men.

For modern Europeans, fascism, in both its pre- and post-Second World War manifestations, with its exaltation of unconstrained masculinity on secular or religious grounds, its jubilation of ‘Teutonic’ or other pre-modern values over the modern ones, and its attempt to demolish all civic ideologies and institutions that have been built to administer male energy, embodies the archetypal European form of pure barbarism. Seen from this perspective, the wearing of the headscarf, symbolizing the subordination of women to men within the Islamic communities in Europe, including Turkey itself, means for many Europeans an uncontrolled release of dangerous male energy from the civilizing impact of women, a return to the dark ages, a breakdown of Western civilization, a resurgence of barbarism and, finally, a resurrection of fascism. Hence, it is no coincidence that terms like ‘Islamic fascism’ or ‘Islamofascism’ have been gaining wide currency among the American and European media, politicians and public intellectuals, to designate repressive Islamic fundamentalist movements inclined towards terrorism. Nick Cohen, a noted British journalist, author and political commentator, in an article published in The Observer accused the left of being apologists of Islamofascism:

‘Islamic fascism is still fascism ... Islamofascism has been ripping through the Arab world ... and it should be the Left’s worst nightmare. It’s everything the

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Left has resisted since the French revolution. Islamic revival touches upon many, thorough-going and deep-seated strings in the modern European psyche, and it signifies much more than a simple question of inter-cultural dialogue, alliance of civilizations and multiculturalism. Ironically, scared by the potential fascism they see embodied in the Islamic resurgence among immigrant Muslim communities, many Europeans in countries like France, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, have taken refuge in their own fascist movements. This fear of Muslim ‘barbarism’ and the resulting flood towards European ‘barbarism’ has been massively accelerated by September 11, by the Madrid and London bombings, the killing of the Dutch filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, and the riots and car-burnings in the Muslim-populated suburbs of Paris.

Concluding remarks

In both France and Germany, historical memory, as narrated and codified in school books for example, typically treats Turkey as falling outside the physical and cultural boundaries of Europe. Current popular images of Turkey, shaped largely by day-to-day encounters between ordinary French and German citizens and Turkish or Muslim immigrants living in those countries, have reinforced the claims of this codified historical memory that Turkey does not belong to Europe. How do identity considerations influence political choices? First of all, they do so to the extent that political leaders take account of public opinion when making domestic or foreign policy decisions. Hence, when French and German public opinion turned against Turkey’s membership in the EU, as they did in recent years, it becomes very difficult for political leaders to come forward in defence of Turkey, even if they believe that, on the grounds of pure rational interest calculations, Turkish accession to the EU makes sense. This was the difficult position that the former French President, Jacques Chirac, often found himself in. Sometimes, the negative public stance against Turkey was used by certain political leaders as a bullet to kill another proposal that they opposed, by establishing a link, in the public discourse, between that proposal and the Turkish issue. That happened with the EU Constitution in France. Those opposed to the Constitution tied it to the issue of Turkish EU membership, arguing that saying yes in the constitutional referendum meant saying yes to Turkish accession. In this way, they managed to divert part of the general antipathy for Turkey to the EU Constitution, and this became yet another factor behind the French ‘non’ in the May 2005 referendum.

In some cases, political leaders themselves may hold strong personal opinions regarding identity, without necessarily responding to the waves coming from below. This appears to be the case with both Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel. Both leaders have made clear their desire for a tightly united, federal EU, which French politicians have termed as ‘Europe puissance’. This federal EU would be a global power centre, in the economic, political and military sense, on a par with the existing and newly emerging global powers such as the USA, Russia, Japan, China and India. Building this powerful EU, according to the leaders of the French and German right, requires a relatively homogeneous European population, in terms of shared historical legacies and common cultural values.

The assumption that a powerful state, in this case a federal EU, can only be built upon a culturally homogeneous nation, is a peculiarly French and German idea, originating in the specific nation-building experiences of these two countries. Sarkozy and Merkel are committed to keeping Turkey outside the EU, precisely because they believe that its inclusion would permanently disrupt the cultural harmony among the European populations, bringing an end to all their attempts to build a united and strong ‘European state’. In the case of Sarkozy and Merkel, historical memory, identity considerations and rational interest calculations seem to have been mingled together in a particular mix.

How can these anti-Turkish identity narratives be countered? According to a well-known study on ‘national brands’, the historically formed and deeply ingrained ‘brand image’ of a nation—for instance, the widespread geographic, historical and religious convictions in Europe regarding Turkey—changes only very slowly and over a long period of time.34 This means that there is not much that can be done, at least in the short term, to change the historically formed images which exclude Turkey from Europe. In the short and medium term, say in the span of 5–10 years, perhaps the best way to improve Turkey’s image in Europe is to try to appeal to the other self-conception of Europe, which is based on what can be called the ‘Enlightenment values’, encompassing universalism, humanism, rationalism, tolerance, individual rights and democracy. This other self-definition of Europe, stemming from the secular values of the Enlightenment, is equally, if not more, powerful, compared to the European values built upon the ideas of geography, history and religion. One empirical indicator of the predominance of Enlightenment values in shaping European self-perceptions can be found in the 2001 cross-country qualitative study on European identity, referred to above. In this study, when talking about what they believed constituted the fundamental European values, respondents mentioned the terms ‘religion’ and ‘Christianity’ only five times; on the other hand, they made 83 references to ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’.35 ‘Enlightenment values’ also form the core values of the EU, as embodied for instance in the Copenhagen criteria. Turkish Muslims cannot change their religion, but the Turkish government can certainly improve the rights and status of Turkish women, whose liberties are curtailed in the larger society partly with a reference to Islamic beliefs and traditions. The Turkish state cannot be relocated to central Europe, but it can certainly do more to increase dialogue and cooperation with other European countries at the level of civil society. Finally, many more steps can be taken to improve the Turkish record on human rights. Taking the right steps in the direction of ‘Enlightenment values’ appears to be the best option for making a meaningful positive change in Turkey’s image in Europe in the short term.

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35OPTEM, 2001, op. cit.